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VICTORY OVER JAPAN USHERS IN ACUTE PERIOD IN FAR EAST

WITH Japan's acceptance of unconditional surrender on August 14, the Second World War has passed into history. It was only after the gravest indecision that Tokyo recognized the inevitability of defeat, for behind the wall of secrecy that separates Japan from the rest of the world an intense political struggle apparently went on between those leaders who considered it necessary to yield and others who wished to continue the war or, at any rate, to avoid unconditional surrender. The main factors responsible for the crisis were the use of the atom bomb by the United States and the entrance of Soviet forces into Manchuria and Korea, where they have made significant advances in a brief period of operations. These two events were decisive for Japan's military situation, which was already highly precarious, because they opened up the Japanese homeland to the possibility of early invasion, while immediately undermining the Japanese position on the continent of Asia.

JAPAN'S UNITY SHAKEN. The Tokyo press, according to the Japanese radio, has emphasized as never before the need for national unity and obedience to the Emperor. This type of appeal to the people reflected the sharpness of differences within the government, for the call to unity could be the prelude either to unconditional surrender or to a rejection of the Allied position. Apparently, in their desperate internal conflict over the best way of meeting the current crisis, Japan's rulers were anxiously urging national unity in the hope that whoever emerged victorious among the top clique would be able to secure continued popular support. Yet, even in so authoritarian and repressed a nation as Japan, division among the leaders must have profound repercussions throughout the general population.

That the division was real is indicated by the fact that on August 12 the official Japanese news agency,

Domei, broadcast and later retracted an "imperial" communiqué reporting the launching of an offensive against the Allied armies "along all fronts." Still more enlightening is the text of an editorial in the newspaper, *Yomiuri Hochi*, which warns against "the danger of internal split and conflict" and then declares: "In the first place the nation's leadership must be one. The government is now called upon to maintain its unity and coherence; so is the Army."

THE EMPEROR AS AN OBSTACLE. The future of the Emperor has been the central theme of discussion in the Allied world and apparently in Japan as well. The Anglo-American-Chinese ultimatum issued at Potsdam on July 26, and later subscribed to by the Soviet Union, was silent on this question, leaving a distinct possibility of the Emperor's being retained if other conditions were met. The terms of the declaration seemed to offer Japan more lenient treatment than Germany is receiving, but to permit a harsher interpretation at a later date. The ultimatum, in short, was sufficiently flexible to encompass the diverse viewpoints among and within the Big Four and to allow these attitudes to work themselves out toward a common solution in the course of time.

The Allied views, already rejected by Japan, were reconsidered in Tokyo last week. The new Japanese reaction, as embodied in the note of August 10 to the Big Four, was to accept the Potsdam ultimatum "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler." This innocent-sounding proviso was immediately interpreted in some quarters as being no more than a request that the Emperor be retained, and the view developed that, if the Japanese felt so deeply about their Emperor, we should not risk lengthening the war by insisting that he lose his throne. But long, however, it was realized that "the pre-

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of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler" are identical with the powers of the Throne under Japan's autocratic constitution and that Allied acceptance of this formula would seriously affect the completeness of victory.

The constitution characterizes the Emperor as being "sacred and inviolable," and his prerogatives include, among other powers, the right to deal with the most important matters of state by special ordinance without genuinely consulting the Japanese parliament; to be in supreme command of the Army and Navy; to declare war, make peace and conclude treaties; and to sanction laws and order them to be promulgated and executed. It is true that the Emperor exercises his powers on the advice of the men around him, rather than on his own initiative, but this does not make his powers any the less far-reaching.

BIG FOUR ESCAPE TRAP. Naturally, even if the Big Four had agreed to the Japanese proposal, Japan would not be allowed to maintain an army or navy or to exercise freedom of action under Allied occupation. It may be assumed that Japan's rulers were aware of these facts. But they probably hoped to win two objectives, if our assent had been given—first of all, to secure our aid in maintaining their grip on their own people; and, secondly, to establish a potential argument against our controls at a later date. For if conditions should at some time permit, they could use the phrase about prerogatives in arguing that particular measures of control constituted a violation of our pledge to respect the Emperor's rights.

This trap was avoided through the note of August 11 which Secretary of State Byrnes issued on behalf of the Big Four. According to the text, the Emperor's authority was to "be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms." The Emperor was to serve as an instrument of the Supreme Commander, while "the ultimate form of government of Japan" was to rest on "the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." In this way the Big Four indicated their intention to make use of the Emperor to carry out and implement the surrender of the Japanese forces, but refused to make any long-term pledges. As in the case of the Potsdam ultimatum, the formula left many issues unsettled, for example, whether or not we would actively encourage the Japanese people to establish a non-imperial form of government. But the immediate effect of the Byrnes note was to take the Big Four safely over the hurdle shrewdly placed in their path when Japan submitted its surrender offer.

ISSUES IN ASIA SHARPENED. Now that the Japanese government has yielded, accepting national defeat for the first time in its history, it will be-

come apparent that the abrupt termination of the war in Asia has intensified the problems of that region. In the West, before V-E day, the war against Nazi Germany moved gradually toward its conclusion, so that many political issues were adjusted under the pressure of military necessity and the knowledge that the post-war period was approaching. Yet, even in these relatively favorable circumstances innumerable questions remained unsettled, the Polish problem constituting a particularly good example. In Asia, on the other hand, there has been no prolonged period of preparation for peace, for the war has ended at a time when the line-up of the Big Four against Japan has just been achieved. As a result, of this premature birth of peace, the months following Japan's defeat will be unusually critical. This is especially true because the sharpness of the transition from war to peace will affect the economic and political equilibrium of many nations, including the United States, and in turn have repercussions on foreign policy.

CHINA'S GROWING CRISIS. Perhaps the clearest example of the difficulties before us is to be found in China, where Russian armies have poured into Manchuria, the Chinese Communists are operating in a vast region, largely in north and central China, and the forces of the Chungking government—the Central régime recognized by the powers—hold other extensive territories, chiefly in central, southern and western China. It has long been realized that, without a Chungking-Communist agreement, there would be sharp competition between the two to take over areas surrendered by the Japanese. But today there is a real danger that a victorious China will be split into two or more parts and that the great powers may be ranged on opposite sides.

These issues are not insoluble by peaceful methods, but the facts are unpromising. Since the early part of this year political differences between Chungking and the Communists have been growing rapidly. Last month there were sharp military clashes between the two on the frontiers of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, the main base of the Communist forces. On August 10 General Chu Teh, Communist Commander-in-Chief, ordered his troops to disarm and accept the surrender of Japanese and Chinese puppet forces in their zones of operations. Two days later Chiang Kai-shek declared that Chungking had made thorough provisions for disarming enemy troops and recovering lost territory. He ordered the Communists to "remain in their posts and wait for further directions," stating that "all our troops are warned hereby never again to take independent action." But in the absence of political agreement it seems most unlikely that this assertion of authority will have effect. It is important largely as an indication of the growing tension inside China,

as the day approaches when Japanese forces in China will give up their arms and when cities like Shanghai and Peiping will again be free.

It may properly be pointed out that the early end of the war will save many parts of Asia from the destruction involved in major campaigns to expel the Japanese. This means that economic facilities in Malaya, Indo-China, Thailand, the Indies and occupied China will remain relatively intact and that in

some respects the problems of reconstruction and relief will be eased. Nevertheless, the difficulties ahead are enormous, and nothing should be allowed to obscure the precariousness of the peace which the United Nations have won. To transform the period before us from one of mere absence of war to a state of genuine peace will require all the intelligence and honesty of which men are capable.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER

HOW WILL ATOMIC BOMB AND WAR AS A CRIME AFFECT U.S. POLICY?

The dramatic use of the atomic bomb has shocked mankind into realizing that this newest weapon of war, unless rigidly controlled by the nations that possess its secret, can be used not only to shorten war—as was done in Japan—but can spell destruction for large areas of the world. Terrible as are the potentialities of the atomic bomb, we must not waste time in deprecating its use. Instead, we must be more determined than ever to prevent the recurrence of war. For once we admit, as some people do, that war is natural or inevitable, then it becomes difficult to denounce any weapons, no matter how destructive or horrifying, which may be used to prosecute it, and even to shorten the agony of modern warfare. Aggressive war itself is a crime; the particular weapons used to wage it at any given time in history are merely accessories after the fact.

WAR MUST BE RECOGNIZED AS A CRIME. This is why the announcement on August 8 in London that representatives of the United States, Britain, Russia and France had accepted Justice Robert H. Jackson's formula that war is a crime for which its instigators and perpetrators can be tried as war criminals is potentially as revolutionary and far-reaching in its implications as the discovery of the atomic bomb. Although thus far restricted to the European Axis countries, this concept could, if consistently applied by the United Nations to any future aggressors, provide the safeguard we need against the abuse of mankind's scientific genius for destructive ends.

So far there has been real danger of our seemingly limitless capacity for invention and machine production hopelessly outrunning our capacity to control relations between nations. Social scientists have seemed timorous, barren of new ideas, and unduly addicted to conventional patterns as compared with their colleagues working in the laboratories of universities and factories. In a series of agreements nations have feebly tried to humanize and regulate war—as if anything so essentially inhuman as war could be made tolerable in the machine age. True, the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 agreed to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy—but with so many reservations, explicit and implicit, as to invalidate that pact from the outset. Yet here was the seed the United Nations War Crimes Com-

mission is trying to bring to fruition. For as Justice Jackson has cogently argued, if war is outlawed, then those who provoke war are outside the pale of law, and should be treated as criminals. If war is recognized by mankind as a crime, and shorn of honor as it has already been shorn of glory, history may record our so far brutal century as a new era in human relations.

WORLD ORGANIZATION NEEDED MORE THAN EVER. How will these two simultaneous discoveries—the atomic bomb and the concept of war as a crime—affect the foreign policy of the United States? The new bomb gives added evidence, if this were needed, that isolation is impossible. The long-range bomber, the use of V-1 and V-2 bombs and jet planes had already demonstrated the ineffectiveness of frontiers and static fortifications against attacks on a nation's territory. Now the United States, Britain and Canada possess the secret of a weapon which could play havoc with land and sea defenses, as well as with the industrial resources necessary to wage modern war. It is fortunate, from our point of view, that the secret is held by three democratic countries which, in modern times, have shown no predilection for militarism; and President Truman, in his broadcast of August 9, indicated that the three countries intended to keep their secret until adequate controls against its misuse had been devised.

But the United States cannot prevent other countries from pursuing similar scientific research, and arriving sooner or later at similar results. In fact, the use of weapons like the atomic bomb may cause interesting shifts in the balance of power worked out by the Big Three. For, as Brig. Gen. David Sarnoff, president of the Radio Corporation of America, has pointed out, small nations skilled in scientific research would have as deadly a power at their command as the great nations, provided they were ready to make the necessary expenditures—and money invested in laboratories might seem to them a more productive investment than money spent on inevitably ineffective land, naval or air forces. It is therefore more than ever in the interest of the United States—and the other great powers—to speed the establishment of a strong and responsible interna-

tional organization in which smaller nations would feel assured of protection against attack.

OUR IDEALS MUST SHAPE POLICY. The discovery of the atomic bomb also enhances the need for the United States to harmonize its practices in foreign affairs more closely than in the past with its professed ideals. This country has the power to make itself feared. It can exercise its power constructively only if it succeeds in making itself trusted. The weakness of American foreign policy has been that, frequently, when faced with concrete situations, we have seemed to fall short of our ideals, which have served as inspiration to other peoples. What are the roots of these ideals? The Swedish sociologist, Gunnar Myrdal, looking dispassionately at the "American Creed," has pointed out that this country, born of revolution, has felt an instinctive sympathy for revolutionary movements elsewhere, especially in the colonies; that even the values we are conservative about—that we seek to conserve—are liberal values, and that Americans, more than any other people, think in moral terms and are concerned about social justice, even though we do not always achieve it at home. Our primary endeavor in the atomic age, the age when war may become punishable as a crime, is to translate these features of the American Creed into foreign policy.

Our task during the war years has been rendered difficult by the fact that the government of one of our principal allies, Britain, seemed averse to fundamental change both in Europe and Asia; and that, in trying to cooperate with Britain, we made it possible for Russia to become a mouthpiece for the changes we would otherwise have favored, or at least accepted. This potential conflict between Britain and Russia made the position of the United States both ambiguous and lacking in inspiration for the peoples of Europe and Asia who hoped to find here leadership in the advancement of political and economic democracy. The victory of the British Labor party has removed an obstacle to the application of our ideals in foreign policy; and if the United States and Britain now jointly support individuals and groups throughout the world who try to root out Fascism, Russia will no longer be able to act as sole proponent of anti-Fascism. This equalization in the roles of the three great powers should greatly facilitate orderly democratic reform both in Europe and Asia.

Scientists have shown us that nothing is impossible for those who have the will to succeed. There is no reason to assume that human relations are more subject to limitations than scientific discovery.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The first in a series of two articles.)

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

What To Do With Japan, by Wilfrid Fleisher. New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1945. \$2.00

A compact summary of the main issues involved in dealing with a defeated Japan. The author belongs to the school which would preserve the institution of the Emperor after Japan's defeat.

Omnipotent Government, by Ludwig Von Mises. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944. \$3.75

The Austrian economist, Von Mises, expounds the argument in this volume that increasing economic nationalism, which is so conducive to war, has been engendered by increasing government intervention in private economic life.

Public Opinion and the Last Peace, by R. B. McCallum. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$3.50

A study of public opinion in England over the last quarter-century with respect to attitudes concerning the treaty of Versailles and the changes which occurred in British thought about the last peace settlement.

The Big Three, by David Dallin. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1945. \$2.75

The main lines of Russian foreign policy, which are interpreted as following the course charted by the Tsars, are seen in conflict with basic British interests in the Far East, the Middle East and Europe. In the resulting struggle, the author believes, the United States will be forced to side with Britain against an expanding Russia.

American Guerrilla in the Philippines, by Ira Wolfert. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945. \$2.75

Leyte Calling, by Joseph F. St. John. New York, Vanguard Press, 1945. \$2.00

Dramatic stories of two young Americans who fought in the difficult guerrilla warfare prevailing in the islands. Wolfert tells, in his own highly literate style, of Lt. Iliff D. Richardson's experience as a major in the Filipino guerrilla army after serving in the "expendables" retreat from the Philippines. Howard Handleman tells of Lt. St. John's exciting adventures.

America's Role in the World Economy, by Alvin H. Hansen. New York, W. W. Norton, 1945. \$2.50

In this book, written for the average reader, the world-renowned economist presents the case for full employment in the United States and outlines the foundations for world economic security. The various international agencies—the Monetary Fund, World Bank, I.L.O., and others—are reviewed in simple terms. The crucial part which America must play in world economic revival after the war is fully explained.

The Secret History of the War, by Waverly Root. New York, Scribner, 1945. 2 vols. \$10.00

Violently non-objective, bitter in denouncing State Department policy, this gigantic work is more sensational than "secret," given to citing hearsay rather than accurate sources.

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